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PROTECTING THE SILENCE OF SPEECH: ACADEMIC SAFE
SPACES, THE FREE SPEECH CRITIQUE, AND THE
SOLUTION OF FREE ASSOCIATION
Trevor N. Ward*
INTRODUCTION
Safe Space policies in higher education have captured the attention of modern
commentators.1 Critics of academic Safe Spaces argue that such policies limit the
free expression of ideas and negatively impact students’ abilities to learn.2 Propo-
nents of Safe Spaces, however, argue that these policies restrict harmful speech,
effectively protecting the interests of minority students.3 At issue in this national
debate is the impact of speech; essentially, commentators have created a normative
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018. BA, Saginaw Valley State Uni-
versity, 2015. I would be remiss if I did not recognize the scholarly and intellectual guidance
of my dear friends Ms. Nicole Berwick, Mr. Cody Corbin, and Ms. Allison Martuch, who
have consistently challenged my ideas and made me a better writer, student, and person. I
would also like to recognize Drs. Julie Keil and Lee Trepanier, who continue to be astound-
ing academic mentors in my life, always encouraging me to pursue my goals and challenging
my worldviews.
1 See, e.g., Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from Scary Ideas, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-hiding
-from-scary-ideas.html (discussing the modern Safe Space debate); see also Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door,” 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1343, 1362–63 (2002) (recognizing the debate among academics about Safe Spaces
in academia); Stuart M. Israel, Letters, Etc.—Judge Avern Cohn: Journalism and Awards,
1976–2015, 95 MICH. B.J. 54 (2016) (review of a collection of articles by Judge Cohn) (ac-
knowledging a modern tension between Safe Space policies and the First Amendment).
2 See Alex Morey, Journalism Professor: ‘College Is Not a Safe Space,’ FIRE (Dec. 3,
2015), https://www.thefire.org/journalism-professor-college-is-not-a-safe-space/ [https://perma
.cc/MF5F-8M58]; Richard Pérez-Peña et al., University of Chicago Strikes Back Against
Campus Political Correctness, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016
/08/27/us/university-of-chicago-strikes-back-against-campus-political-correctness.html.
3 See Morton Schapiro, I’m Northwestern’s President. Here’s Why Safe Spaces for Students
Are Important., WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how
-to-create-inclusive-campus-communities-first-create-safe-places/2016/01/15/069f3a66-bb94
-11e5-829c-26ffb874a18d_story.html?utm_term=.8c784afb86d2 [https://perma.cc/PY2D
-AKF3]; Valerie Strauss, So You Like the University of Chicago’s Rejection of ‘Safe Spaces’
for Students? Consider This., WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2016/08/30/so-you-like-the-university-of-chicagos-rejection-of
-safe-spaces-for-students-consider-this/ [https://perma.cc/5YV6-VCRC].
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dichotomy around the ideals of free speech and expression. Proponents, on the one
hand, believe that limiting harmful speech promotes inclusion and, therefore,
academic success for minority students.4 Critics, on the other hand, view the limita-
tion of speech as an affront to the free expression of ideas, therefore harming
education.5 Yet, despite their differing conclusions, both sides of this debate gener-
ally agree that the issues of Safe Space policies implicate students’ speech and
expression interests.6
It is unsurprising that the Safe Space debate has been characterized in the verbiage
of free speech. After all, the United States has a robust social and legal culture em-
bracing free expression in the marketplace of ideas.7 Moreover, the political and
philosophical foundations of any democratic society necessitate the free and open
dialogue of the citizenry.8 Further, as many commentators note, free speech and ex-
pression are particularly implicated in higher education because of the supposed
academic value of open dialogue; and, even proponents of Safe Spaces concede that
the university system is principally based on the free exchange of ideas between stu-
dents, faculty, and staff.9
Limiting the Safe Space debate to a discussion of free speech, however, is detri-
mental to the very right the debate implicates. Consider the effect on free speech if
4 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
6 See Sophie Downes, Trigger Warnings, Safe Spaces, and Free Speech, Too, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/opinion/trigger-warnings-safe-spaces
-and-free-speech-too.html (discussing the free speech implications of Safe Spaces); see also
supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (reasoning
that libel laws did not protect public officials to the same degree as private persons because
of the inherent value of political speech); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 24–28 (1960) (positing that free speech
permits self-governance, a cornerstone of American society); Martin H. Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 596–611 (1982) (discussing the value of speech in
American civil society and governance).
8 Corey Brettschneider, Democratic Persuasion and Freedom of Speech: A Response
to Four Critics and Two Allies, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (2014) (“Liberalism demands
robust rights to free expression. In American jurisprudence, the liberal state is bound by one
of the world’s strictest rules protecting free speech . . . .”).
9 See Matt Ford, President Obama on Political Correctness, ATLANTIC (Sept. 14, 2015,
10:13 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2015/09/president-obama-on-political-correct
ness/405328/ [https://perma.cc/M5BV-YYXC] (indicating that President Barack Obama
recognizes the necessity of free speech in education); Strauss, supra note 3; Robert J. Zimmer,
Free Speech Is the Basis of a True Education, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/free-speech-is-the-basis-of-a-true-education-1472164801 [https://web.archive
.org/web/20171110122457/https://www.wsj.com/articles/free-speech-is-the-basis-of-a-true
-education-1472164801] (arguing that free speech is necessary for higher education).
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the proponents of Safe Space policies prevail. To prevail, proponents of Safe Spaces
must show—either normatively or constitutionally—that the right to be free from
harmful speech is greater than the rights of the speaker.10 If successful, proponents
of Safe Spaces will effectively dilute expression and speech on college campuses.
Alternatively, if the critics of Safe Spaces prevail, then the interests of minorities—that
is, their interest in being free from potentially harmful speech—must give in to the
majoritarian interests of speaking.11
By focusing their rhetoric on speech and expression, each side of the debate
risks diluting free expression; or, in the alternative, subjecting minority students to
potentially harmful speech. Additionally, using speech as the cornerstone of the Safe
Space debate risks damaging the free speech doctrine, as well as endangers the well-
established normative qualities of free expression in higher education.12
To avoid the risks detailed above, I argue that the interests protected by Safe
Spaces can be adequately protected by existing intimate and expressive association
doctrine.13 And that, by shifting the conversation from restricting speech based on the
state’s interest of inclusion and minority rights, to the private associational interests
of groups, both free speech and free association doctrines are bolstered.14
Viewing the Safe Space debate as a dichotomy between free association and free
speech has several positive effects. First, it spares the doctrine of free speech from
unnecessary attack and criticism from those that favor Safe Spaces.15 Second, the in-
terests of those in the Safe Space are better accounted for through their free, intimate
and expressive associational interests,16 since their ability to associate with certain
persons, thoughts, and ideas is protected under the umbrella of free association.17
While Safe Space policies take several forms,18 the Organizational Safe Space
model19 provides the best conduit to frame this debate in the proper associational-
speech dichotomy.20 Therefore, I suggest that universities should adopt the Organi-
zational Safe Space model,21 and that the debate concerning such Safe Spaces should
transition from one about restricting free speech, to one concerned about the associa-
tional rights of the Safe Space members.
10 See discussion infra Sections IV.A–B.
11 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
12 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13 See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
14 See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
15 See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
16 See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
17 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (recognizing that “the Court has rec-
ognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the
First Amendment”).
18 See discussion infra Sections I.B–D.
19 I explain the intricacies of this model in Section I.D.3.
20 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
21 See discussion infra Sections III.C, IV.C.
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As indicated, this Note aims to pivot the discussion of academic Safe Spaces from
restrictions on speech to the protection of associational rights.22 Instead of focusing
solely on free speech and expression, I aim to demonstrate that Safe Space mem-
bers’ associational rights can be used to defend against the harmful expression of the
majority.23 Not only will such a focus bolster intimate associational rights, it will also
serve to protect the robust nature of free speech and expression in academia. More than
this, by altering the debate, I hope to positively impact the general discussion of Safe
Spaces. At present, Safe Spaces are viewed as an institution with the main purpose of
restricting rights (namely, free speech rights).24 By shifting the debate, Safe Spaces
can be normatively viewed as an institution protecting and promoting rights (in this
case, associational interests).
Because this Note concerns the constitutional implications of Safe Space policies,
and the interplay between the free speech and association doctrines, the focus of this
Note is on state-run Safe Space policies. While many modern workplaces are adopting
Safe Space policies,25 the clear majority of Safe Spaces have developed in higher
education.26 Therefore, this Note is limited to analyzing the Safe Space policies of
state universities.
Additionally, I will avoid a normative discussion of Safe Spaces. As the national
debate informs, Safe Spaces are a difficult issue.27 The interests of the various groups
are compelling;28 and I do not, here, aim to argue for or against either side of the debate.
I recognize that the proponents and opponents of Safe Spaces have strong interests
in the outcome of this national debate.29 With that in mind, I hope I have written this
Note with sensitivity and an understanding of those passions. To be sure, it is also
not my aim to comment on the overarching philosophical themes, or the qualitative
impact of, Safe Space policies. Rather, my goal is merely to analyze university Safe
22 See discussion infra Part IV.
23 See discussion infra Part IV.
24 See, e.g., Mae Kuykendall & Charles Adside III, Unmuting the Volume: Fisher, Affir-
mative Action Jurisprudence, and the Legacy of Racial Silence, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1011, 1077–78 (2014); see also supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text; discussion infra Sec-
tions IV.A–B.
25 See, e.g., NICOLE C. RAEBURN, CHANGING CORPORATE AMERICA FROM INSIDE OUT:
LESBIAN AND GAY WORKPLACE RIGHTS 208–10 (2004) (discussing the advent of Safe Spaces
in the workplace); see also Ellen McGirt, Top Diversity Exec Tells How He Creates a ‘Safe
Space’ at Work, FORTUNE (Sept. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/diversity-safe-spaces
-workplace/ [http://perma.cc/6U96-YMN6].
26 See discussion infra Section I.D.
27 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Section III.C
(discussing the positive, normative attributes of both Safe Space policies and the Free Speech
critique).
28 See discussion infra Part III.
29 See generally discussion infra Part III.
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Spaces and the doctrines of free speech and free association. Based on that analysis,
I hope to reconcile students’ free speech rights with university Safe Space policies.
To that end, Part I of this Note will review the history and development of Safe
Spaces in the mid-twentieth century.30 Specifically, Part I will highlight the genesis of
Safe Spaces in academia and their role in higher education.31 From here, I will posit
that there are three principle forms of Safe Spaces which deserve attention: Tradi-
tional Safe Spaces, Campus-Wide Safe Zones, and Organizational Safe Spaces.32 In
Part II of this Note, I will discuss the constitutional doctrines of free speech and asso-
ciation, laying the proper analytical framework of the subsequent sections.33 Part III
will review the normative value in reconciling the so-called free-speech critique34 with
Safe Space policies.35 In Part IV of this Note, I will apply the doctrines of free speech
and association to the three principle forms of Safe Spaces.36 There, I will conclude
that the Organizational Safe Space Model is the best form of Safe Space policy for
reconciling the free speech critique with Safe Spaces.37 Lastly, I will address some of
the notable criticisms of my approach, and dismiss the concerns of these criticisms.38
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE SPACES: FROM LITERAL
SAFE ZONES TO ACADEMIC POLICY
Safe Spaces are a relatively novel phenomenon in Western society; the earliest
manifestation of American Safe Spaces can be traced to the mid-1950s.39 Because
of their novelty, a proper analysis of modern Safe Space policies necessitates a brief
review of their development.
30 See discussion infra Section I.A.
31 See discussion infra Section I.B.
32 See discussion infra Section I.C.
33 See discussion infra Part II.
34 The Free Speech Critique references the argument against Safe Spaces based on either
constitutional or normative free speech grounds. This critique is discussed in greater detail
in Part III.
35 See discussion infra Part III.
36 See discussion infra Part IV.
37 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
38 See discussion infra Part V.
39 MOIRA RACHEL KENNEY, MAPPING GAY L.A.: THE INTERSECTION OF PLACE AND POLI-
TICS 24–25 (2001); Christina Paxson, Brown University President: A Safe Space for Freedom
of Expression, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/brown-university-president-safe-spaces-don’t-threaten-freedom-of-expression-they-protect
-it/2016/09/05/6201870e-736a-11e6-8149-b8d05321db62_story.html?utm_term=.1b33a12f
218c [https://perma.cc/869D-QHFD]; Ben Zimmer, Roots of the ‘Safe Space’ Controversy; The
Battle over ‘Safe Spaces’ for Marginalized People Derives Partly from Some Publications
of the 1970s, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/roots-of-the-safe
-space-controversy-1447429433 [https://perma.cc/XV3H-Y9V8] (indicating that the term Safe
Space first appeared as part of the feminist movement).
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A. The Gender-Rights Movements40: Developing Safe Zones to Protect the
Movement and Its Members
Most commentators contend that Safe Spaces began with the American feminist
movement of the mid-twentieth century.41 According to this common narrative,
feminists adopted the idea of Safe Spaces to protect women from abusive relation-
ships, as well as to provide a zone of comfort for members of the movement to
openly discuss their collective oppression.42 Historically, such spaces took the form
of physical safe houses or shelters.43
Thereafter, Safe Spaces were “extended to denote spaces where violence and
harassment against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer community
would not be tolerated.”44 Specifically, the gay-rights movement utilized geographic
areas in municipalities to create physical zones of safety.45 These areas were friendly
to members of the LGBT46 community, and ensured that the members would not be
harassed by the majority population.47
As the gender-rights movements garnered success, widespread social violence
and harassment of gender minorities decreased.48 Resulting, the gender-rights move-
ments turned their attention to the workplace and academia.49 Because of the general
success and appeal of Safe Space policies during the early years of the movements, the
gender-rights’ leadership adapted Safe Spaces to apply to the workplace.50 These Safe
Spaces were used by gender minorities to express their collective struggle and discuss
individualized incidents of discrimination.51 Workplace Safe Spaces were also used
as a buffer between gender minorities and the majority-dominated professional world.52
40 “Gender Rights Movement,” as referenced in this Note, will refer to the feminist and
the gay-rights movements collectively.
41 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42 KENNEY, supra note 39, at 23–25.
43 See id. at 23–24 (“[S]afe space[s] impl[y] a certain license to speak and act freely . . . not
only a physical space but also a space created by the coming together of women searching
for community.”).
44 Paxson, supra note 39.
45 CHRISTINA B. HANHARDT, SAFE SPACE: GAY NEIGHBORHOOD HISTORY AND THE
POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 81–83 (2013) (discussing changing neighborhoods and the advent of
“safe street patrols”).
46 While understanding the ever-changing consciousness of sexual identity, I use “LGBT”
to reference all sexual minorities. My use of this colloquial acronym is not intended to be
exclusionary. Rather, I use the abbreviation because of its widespread acceptance in col-
loquial language.
47 See HANHARDT, supra note 45, at 81–83; Paxson, supra note 39.
48 See, e.g., RAEBURN, supra note 25, at 5–11 (discussing the movement against, and
gradual decrease in, employment discrimination against LGBT Americans).
49 Id. at 1–11.
50 See, e.g., id. at 208–10.
51 See id.
52 See id.
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B. Safe Spaces in Academia
As detailed above, the original Safe Space was a literal safe zone, used to provide
physical protection to the membership.53 Over time, however, gender minorities began
to receive basic societal protections; because of this, minorities garnered enhanced
physical safety, protected by some institutional barriers.54 Resulting, the gender-rights
movements focused their attention on equality in higher educational institutions.55 It
was at this point that Safe Spaces extended to the higher education arena.56 In its earliest
manifestation, Safe Spaces were physical zones—offices, dormitories, or other physical
location at the university “where students from marginalized groups [could] come to-
gether to feel comfortable discussing their experiences and just being themselves.”57
While Safe Spaces were developed to protect the interests of gender minorities,
recent social developments have led to the inclusion of racial minorities as well.58
In fact, most modern definitions of Safe Spaces provide that the zone of safety is
open to all minorities, whether they be sexual, gender, racial, or other.59
C. Defining Safe Spaces
Analyzing the constitutional implications of Safe Space policies requires a con-
crete definition of Safe Spaces themselves. However, defining Safe Space policies
is no easy task.60 One reason for this difficulty is that Safe Spaces incongruently
evolved from the gay-rights and feminist movements of the mid-twentieth century.61
Therefore, the precise development of the Safe Space cannot be squarely traced to
one singular movement or ideology.62 As a result, it is difficult to track the evolution
53 See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 39.
56 See, e.g., Katherine Ho, Tackling the Term: What Is a Safe Space?, HARV. POL. REV.
(Jan. 30, 2017), http://harvardpolitics.com/harvard/what-is-a-safe-space/ [https://perma.cc
/948A-PKRF] (explaining the differences between traditional, “emotional” safe spaces and
“academic safe spaces”); Paxson, supra note 39.
57 See Paxson, supra note 39.
58 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 1362–63; Paxson, supra note 39; Schapiro, supra
note 3.
59 See, e.g., Expect Respect: What to Report, U. MICH. STUDENT LIFE, https://expectre
spect.umich.edu/what-report [https://perma.cc/4FJN-Q7N5] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (pro-
viding a mechanism for students to report speech targeting their “race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, ancestry, age, marital status,
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status”).
60 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 56 (“[B]ecause the term ‘safe space’ is used interchangeably to
refer to . . . very different ideas, the concepts themselves become conflated. People begin to have
bloated and unclear understandings of how academic spaces should be considered ‘safe.’”).
61 See, e.g., Paxson, supra note 39 (recognizing that the term “Safe Space” emerged from
the women’s movement, and was later adopted by the gay-rights movement).
62 See discussion supra Section I.A.
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of the Safe Space, the ideology supporting its existence, as well as the practical
manifestation of these policies.63
Second, Safe Spaces have numerous colloquial and academic definitions.64 For
some, the term Safe Space refers to any general policy that restricts speech at higher
educational institutions.65 Others take a more limited approach, defining the Safe
Space as a single space, meant to provide resources to minority students.66 Still others
view Safe Spaces as literal safe zones: physical locations where minority persons
can be free from stigma, harassment, and violent assault.67 Last, institutions them-
selves implement a diverse array of Safe Space policies, ranging from Campus-Wide
Safe Zones, to mere administrative offices dedicated to diverse students.68
Despite these difficulties, commentators, academics, and university administra-
tors have attempted to specifically define Safe Space policies. Judith Shulevitz, a
journalist for the New York Times, defined Safe Spaces as the “innocuous gatherings
of like-minded people who agree to refrain from ridicule, criticism or what they term
microaggressions.”69 The president of Brown University took a similar approach in
defining Safe Spaces as “places where students from marginalized groups can come
together to feel comfortable discussing their experiences and just being themselves.”70
A more specific definition was proffered by the Georgia Institute of Technology
in a 2007 federal case. In an opinion resolving pretrial motions, the trial court
indicated that Georgia Tech’s Safe Space policy was instituted as
a way for people supportive of [LGBT] concerns to identify them-
selves to the campus and to help gay or questioning students,
faculty, and staff. The Office of Diversity Programs works with
63 See discussion supra Section I.A.
64 See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 1987, 2018 (2017) (“The concept of safe spaces may be the hardest to define of the
various [politically correct] practices . . . . The phrase has a relatively long and evolving
history and continues to fluctuate in meaning. It has been used to denote everything from
locations where people voluntarily agree to speak openly and without judgment to one another,
to places populated by persons who share similar views on social justice issues and are hostile
to opposing views, to areas formally or informally designated as meeting spaces for persons
from marginalized groups.” (internal citations omitted)); Paxson, supra note 39.
65 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
66 Paxson, supra note 39.
67 See Zenobia V. Harris, Breaking the Dress Code: Protecting Transgender Students,
Their Identities, and Their Rights, 13 SCHOLAR 149, 187 (2010) (“A ‘safe space’ is created when
individuals believe that they are not being judged, their opinions are respected, they are
physically safe, and they can trust the people around them. For some, a safe space is a form
of resistance and a place where individuals can recreate and solidify their definition of self,
which can often be challenged by various life experiences.”); see also Schapiro, supra note 3.
68 See discussion infra Section I.D.
69 Shulevitz, supra note 1.
70 Paxson, supra note 39.
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a student coordinator to administer this program . . . . The pro-
gram’s overarching goal is to educate the public and provide a
safe atmosphere and open environments for people who have
questions about gender and sexuality, whether in their own lives,
in the lives of family and friends, or in the wider culture.71
As the aforesaid examples illustrate, Safe Space policies take various forms; and
coming to a singular, specific definition of a Safe Space is difficult. However, there
are certain aspects that most definitions of Safe Spaces incorporate. One such aspect
is that the Safe Space is a place—either physical or metaphysical in nature—where
individuals come together to gain some form of security.72 Another aspect of the
Safe Space is that its members are typically minorities (sexual minorities, gender
minorities, racial minorities, etc.).73 A third, consistent factor of the Safe Space is
that it acts to limit offensive or harmful ideas from infiltrating its membership;74
ideas that are typically promulgated by the majority.75 Considering these factors,
Safe Spaces can be broadly defined as follows: any space where there is a coming
together of persons, with the purpose of excluding any expression which the mem-
bership finds harmful. A policy promulgating a Safe Space, therefore, is any policy
which limits some speech or expression (typically the speech offered by the major-
ity) to promote the interests of the Safe Space members (typically the minority).
D. Modern Manifestation of Safe Spaces in Academia
Because of their prevalence in modern academia, institutions of higher educa-
tion have implemented various types of Safe Space policies. Since every university
has an individualized culture with specific institutional needs,76 there is a wide vari-
ance in the types of policies adopted by universities.77 Despite this variety, there are
three general forms of Safe Space policies worthy of note: Traditional Safe Spaces,
Campus-Wide Safe Zones, and Organizational Safe Spaces.78
71 Sklar v. Clough, No. 1:06-CV-0627-JOF, 2007 WL 2049698, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 6,
2007) (citation omitted).
72 See supra notes 53–57, 64–68 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra
Section I.B.
73 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 67, at 188; Paxson, supra note 39. See generally HANHARDT,
supra note 45.
74 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 56; Paxson, supra note 39; Schapiro, supra note 3; Shulevitz,
supra note 1.
75 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 56; Paxson, supra note 39; Schapiro, supra note 3; Shulevitz,
supra note 1.
76 Barbara Sporn, Managing University Culture: An Analysis of the Relationship Between
Institutional Culture and Management Approaches, 32 J. HIGHER EDUC. 41, 42 (1996) (dis-
cussing the varying cultures of different universities).
77 Id. at 57–58.
78 See discussion infra Sections I.D.1–3.
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1. Traditional Safe Spaces
The Traditional79 Safe Space policy is a policy which designates a specific area of
the school as a Safe Space.80 In modern academia, this physical area is typically an
administrative office dedicated to minority students.81 These Safe Spaces act as a
physical meeting area, where interested students can gather and engage in discussion
about various topics without fear of judgment or prejudice.82 Often all students are
permitted in, and in many circumstances encouraged to visit, the Safe Space.83 Gener-
ally, however, all students are discouraged from voicing opinions which could be
offensive or harmful to a minority.84 Ad-hoc safe spaces have also been created in
this form. For instance, at some universities without an official Safe Space office,
individual staff and faculty members will receive training, and thereafter declare
their office a Safe Space.85
2. Campus-Wide Safe Zones
Although the Traditional Safe Space is confined to an office or other physical
location on a college campus, some universities take a broader approach to Safe Space
policies: Campus-Wide Safe Zones. Such policies aim to make the entire campus—
or a significant part thereof—a Safe Space.86 This type of Safe Space can manifest
79 Because most original academic Safe Space policies took this form, I call such policies
“traditional.” These spaces also utilize a physical zone, akin to the original Safe Spaces of
the gender-rights movement.
80 See, e.g., LGBTQ Safe Space, U. CHI.: LBGTQ STUDENT LIFE, http://lgbtq.uchicago
.edu/page/safe-space [https://perma.cc/TH99-BQPX] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017); see also Safe
Space Training, SANTA CLARA U.: RAINBOW RESOURCE CTR., https://www.scu.edu/oml
/rrc/safe-space-training/ [https://perma.cc/BJ32-AD6M] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
81 See LGBTQ Safe Space, supra note 80; Safe Space Training, supra note 80 (describing
signs which demarcate safe spaces).
82 See Neelesh Moorthy, Sanford Safe Space to Debut this Fall Amidst University of
Chicago Controversy, DUKE CHRON. (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.dukechronicle.com/article
/2016/08/sanford-safe-space-to-debut-this-fall-admins-weigh-in-on-university-of-chicago
-controversy [https://perma.cc/34HG-ULMB] (discussing the Sanford School of Public Policy’s
Safe Space as a “physical ‘safe space’” where students can go to “heal” (emphasis added)).
83 See, e.g., LGBTQ Safe Space, supra note 80 (indicating that the university safe space
program works to shape a “[u]niversity[ ] culture that is accepting of all people, regardless
of sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, or any other difference” (emphasis added)).
84 Cf. Safe Space Training, supra note 80 (indicating Santa Clara University strives to
maintain a respectful environment, but provides safe spaces to address harassment of mi-
nority groups).
85 See id.
86 See, e.g., LSU LGBTQ+ Project and Safe Space: Mission, LA. ST. U., http://www.lsu
.edu/diversity/safespace/about_us/mission.php [https://perma.cc/RJ3H-DG9T] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2017) (stating that LSU’s Safe Space Program “works to make LSU a safer place for
all students”).
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itself in a multitude of different ways. For instance, some universities have created
policies which declare that the entire campus is a safe zone.87 This means that aca-
demic classrooms, recreational facilities, and living areas are Safe Spaces, and that
students must limit their speech on all areas of campus.88 In the most extreme cases,
such policies impose blanket restrictions on expression, which usually ban any offen-
sive speech.89 Some of these policies make exceptions for classroom speech;90 however,
“trigger warnings” may be required.91 A far less intrusive campus-wide policy merely
designates safe zones throughout a campus.92 These safe zones range from residen-
tial dormitories and recreational facilities, to dining halls; the extent of the speech
restrictions, as well as their application to various campus buildings, varies widely
from university to university.93
There are several aspects of the aforementioned policies which are relevant to
note. First, the campus-wide policies referenced above are typically adjoined with
87 See, e.g., Inclusion Working Group, COLO. MESA U., http://www.coloradomesa.edu
/student-services/diversity-and-health/campus-diversity.html [https://perma.cc/5AXN-A7YP]
(last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (“Together, [we work] to ensure that the CMU campus is an envi-
ronment free from discrimination and fostering a climate that is supportive of all.”).
88 Cf. Deanna M. Garrett, Silenced Voices: Hate Speech Codes on Campus, U. VT.,
https://www.uvm.edu/~vtconn/?Page=v20/garrett.html [https://perma.cc/U93N-ZJFL] (last
modified July 29, 2002) (discussing, in part, historical campus-wide speech restrictions on
various college campuses, and their impact on free expression); Kelly Sarabyn, The Twenty-
Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split Over College Students’ First Amendment
Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 27, 33–35 (2008) (discussing universities’ broad restrictions
on free speech, often targeting harassment or other degrading speech).
89 See Garrett, supra note 88.
90 See Zena Hitz, What Is a Safe Space? The Mind of a Student Able to Think Critically.,
WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016
/09/14/what-is-a-safe-space-the-mind-of-a-student-able-to-think-critically/?utm_term
=.7858eba32165 [https://perma.cc/5GTZ-PVKA]; see also, e.g., Anya Kamenetz, Half of
Professions in NPR Ed Survey Have Used ‘Trigger Warnings,’ NPR (Sept. 7, 2016, 4:39 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/09/07/492979242/half-of-professors-in-npr-ed-survey
-have-used-trigger-warnings [https://web.archive.org/web/20171027191452/https://www
.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/09/07/492979242/half-of-professors-in-npr-ed-survey-have-used
-trigger-warnings].
91 Samantha Harris, Mandatory Trigger Warnings, Part Two, FIRE (Sept. 1, 2016), https://
www.thefire.org/mandatory-trigger-warnings-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/NTA9-EUB3] (dis-
cussing university-mandated trigger warnings required by federal law and school policy).
92 As used in this Note, a safe zone indicates any area on campus that is designated as a
Safe Space. This is distinct from the Traditional Safe Space, because safe zones typically
encompass a greater geographic area than a singular office.
93 See, e.g., Emily DeRuy, The Fine Line Between Safe Space and Segregation, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/08/finding-the-line-be
tween-safe-space-and-segregation/496289/ [https://perma.cc/FS25-YH4C] (discussing a trend
in higher education, where colleges have created minority-exclusive housing); Schapiro,
supra note 3.
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“Free Speech Zones.”94 These zones provide an avenue for students to express ideas
that would otherwise be banned by the Safe Space policies.95 Second, while some pub-
lic universities have created campus-wide safe zones,96 many have elected to institute
less intrusive policies.97 Third, some high schools experimented with an alternate
campus-wide policy in the late twentieth century. Beginning with the Harvey Milk
High School in 1985, these high schools were created as separate schools, solely
reserved for gender minorities.98 However, as some have noted, these policies were
seen as a modern manifestation of separate-but-equal.99 Given that these schools
have not become commonplace in secondary education, there is little reason to think
that they will be adopted by institutions of higher learning today.100
The least intrusive campus-wide policies are ones in which the university merely
encourages students, staff, and faculty to create “safe places” for students upon their
request. A 2012 University of Toledo program, for example, “encourage[d] ‘faculty,
staff and graduate assistants and resident advisers to open their space as a Safe Place for
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Questioning . . . individuals.’”101
94 See Sarabyn, supra note 88, at 33 (“[Free Speech Zone] policies limit student speech
and protest to small, often remote areas of campus, effectively rendering the rest of campus
a ‘no speech zone.’” (citation omitted)).
95 See id. at 33–35. Some scholars have postulated that all campuses with free speech
zones—even with no overarching Safe Space policy—unconstitutionally limits the free
speech rights of students. See generally id. To be sure, I do not make that contention in this
Note. Further, it should be noted that, in order for a Safe Space to exist, a university must
make a clear policy promulgating a Safe Space; it is insufficient that a university merely has
a “free speech zone.”
96 Safe Zone Transgender, PENN. ST. STUDENT AFF., https://studentaffairs.psu.edu/lgbtqa
/safezone.shtml [https://perma.cc/899P-XERB] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
97 Private colleges are far more likely to institute campus-wide speech restrictions,
especially if the university has an ideological or technical component. See Kelly Sarabyn,
Free Speech at Private Universities, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 145, 176–81 (2010).
98 See Randy Hedlund, Segregation by Any Other Name: Harvey Milk High School, 33
J.L. & EDUC. 425, 425–27 (2004).
99 As Hedlund opines, separate schooling for gender minorities carries similar stigma and
other problems that the Court addressed in Brown v. Board of Education. Hedlund, supra note
98, at 426–27. Contra Thomas A. Mayes, Separate Public High Schools for Sexual Minority Stu-
dents and the Limits of the Brown Analogy, 35 J.L. & EDUC. 339 (2006) (critiquing Hedlund,
supra note 98, and the analogy to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
100 Contra Themed Living Communities: Halisi Scholars Living Learning Community,
CAL. ST. U. L.A. HOUSING & RESIDENCE LIFE, http://www.calstatela.edu/housing/themed
-living-communities [https://perma.cc/U8U2-YY5Y] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (indicating
that the university offers housing “designed to enhance the residential experience for students
who are a part of or interested in issues regarding the Black community living on campus by
offering the opportunity to connect with faculty and peers, and engage in programs that focus
on academic success, cultural awareness and civic engagement”).
101 Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 277 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see
also LGBTQ+ Student Services: Safe Space Program, CLEV. ST. U., https://www.csuohio
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3. Organizational Safe Spaces
Most state universities sanction the existence of registered student organizations
(RSO).102 While such organizations are controlled and monitored by the university,103
the students have the power to implement various administrative policies through
a charter, constitution, by-laws, or other governing document.104 Pursuant to this power,
some organizations at various universities have created Safe Space policies.105 While
some organizations, such as local chapters of LGBT Allies, may be mandated to imple-
ment such policies by their national or state organizations,106 others can develop Safe
Space policies of their own volition.107
.edu/studentlife/safe-space-program [https://perma.cc/PUK7-YX9V] (last visited Dec. 4,
2017) (indicating that Cleveland University’s student Safe Space program allows LGBTQ
students to recognize community members who can provide support).
102 The colloquial term for on-campus student organizations differs from institution to
institution. For ease, I use the term: “registered student organization” or “RSO.” See, e.g.,
Registered Student Organizations, SAGINAW VALLEY ST. U., http://www.svsu.edu/officeof
studentlife/connect/ [https://perma.cc/CUF7-D2S5] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (“RSOs are
registered student organizations that are formed with a common objective.”); see also Student
Organizations & Activities/Financial Accounts, MICH. ST. U., http://studentlife.msu.edu
/student-organizations-activities [https://perma.cc/4JVV-HSSA] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
103 See, e.g., Annual Registration, HARV. C.: OFF. STUDENT LIFE, http://osl.fas.harvard
.edu/annual-registration [https://perma.cc/J9TB-VKSC] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (“Each
year, at the start of the fall term, student organizations register with the Office of Student
Involvement to continue their recognition by the College and exercise the privileges afforded
to them by virtue of their recognition.”); see also Student Organizations: University Recog-
nition, STAN. U.: STUDENT ACTIVITIES & LEADERSHIP, https://sal.stanford.edu/policies/stu
dent-organizations [https://perma.cc/PE5D-XRW6] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (“Student
organizations wishing to operate in the name of Stanford, use Stanford space or receive funds
from the university . . . must be recognized by the university through Student Activities and
Leadership, annually. . . . The purpose of any recognized student group must be consistent
with the goals and standards of the university.”).
104 See Start a New Student Organization, STAN. U.: STUDENT ACTIVITIES & LEADERSHIP,
https://sal.stanford.edu/get-involved/start-new-student-organization [https://perma.cc/3HS8
-8F9Z] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (requiring new student organizations to draft a governing
document).
105 See, e.g., Constitution, HOKIEPRIDE VA. TECH., http://www.hokiepride.org.vt.edu
/static/documents/HokiePRIDE_Constitution.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK2M-LQPF] (last vis-
ited Dec. 4, 2017) (describing HokiePRIDE’s mission to create a safe space for people of all
sexualities); LGBT Resource Center Affiliated Student Organizations, U. ILL. OFF. INCLU-
SION & INTERCULTURAL REL., https://oiir.illinois.edu/lgbt-resource-center/affiliated-student
-organizations [https://perma.cc/CAH7-38VD] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
106 See, e.g., Establishing an Allies/Safe Zone Program, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://
www.hrc.org/resources/establishing-an-allies-safe-zone-program [https://perma.cc/KW6A
-A55B] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (discussing the specifics of creating LGBT and allies
programs with safe spaces).
107 See, e.g., LGBT Resource Center Affiliated Student Organizations, supra note 105.
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What is most relevant to note about RSOs is that they often exhibit many of the
characteristics necessary to satisfy either intimate or expressive associations.108 As
a result, they are afforded certain constitutional protections.109 Such protections may
include the right to discriminate against certain individuals and restrict some forms
of expression.110 As will be discussed in Part IV, because Organizational Safe Spaces
are most likely to receive associational rights,111 the Safe Space policies these organi-
zations adopt will not directly infringe on the free speech interests of the majority.112
II. OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES
To understand how Organizational Safe Spaces are constitutionally superior to
both Traditional Safe Spaces and Campus-Wide Safe Zones, it is necessary to briefly
discuss the free speech and association doctrines. Below, I will summarize the rele-
vant free speech law, intimate and expressive association doctrines, as well as the
application of theses doctrines in higher education.
A. Free Speech and Expression
Free speech rights in the United States are a cornerstone of our social and
political systems.113 As discussed in the Introduction, the normative qualities of free
speech and expression are important, not only to American political and civil life,
but to the educational system as well.114 To protect against intrusions of free expres-
sion, constitutional jurisprudence has, over time, solidified a robust right to freely
express oneself.115 Below is a brief overview of the modern, free speech doctrine.
1. Unprotected Speech
Despite many of the robust protections afforded to speech in the United States,116
some speech is nevertheless unprotected by the Constitution.117 The quintessential
ruling discussing this limitation was the Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg
v. Ohio.118 In that case, the Supreme Court held that if speech incites imminent lawless
108 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
109 See discussion infra Section III.C.
110 See discussion infra Section III.C.
111 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
112 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
113 See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 7, at 24–28; Redish, supra note 7, at 596–611.
114 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
115 See discussion infra Sections II.B–C.
116 See infra notes 121–40 and accompanying text.
117 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (recognizing that advocacy
directed at inciting “imminent lawless action” is not constitutionally protected).
118 Id.
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action, it is not protected under the First Amendment.119 The Supreme Court has like-
wise held that various other forms speech are not protected by free speech principles.120
2. Content-Based Regulations of Speech
Other than expression falling into the limited category of unprotected speech,
all other forms of verbal or written speech are protected by the First Amendment.121
This is not to say, however, that the state is always barred from regulating the speech
of its citizens.122 To be sure, if speech-related regulations fulfill certain requirements,
they may be held constitutional.123 For example, the Court has held in some cases
that regulations on expression that are content-neutral124 need only satisfy a rational
basis inquiry.125
119 See id.
120 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1942) (stating that
some forms of speech, including “fighting words”—words that are expressed to incite hatred
or violence from the audience—lewd speech, and malicious libel are not protected by the
First Amendment).
121 See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 539,
564–67 (2006) (discussing the forms of unprotected speech, and indicating the relatively
“libertarian” jurisprudence concerning any other forms of speech).
122 See generally Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Govern-
mental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
123 See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV.
695, 703–05 (2011); see also Kagan, supra note 122, at 443–44.
124 For a regulation to be content-neutral, it must not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint
or subject matter. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014) (describing
neutral speech regulations as regulations which serve purposes “unrelated to the content of
expression” and are “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” (cita-
tions omitted)); Kelly P. Welch, Note, Graffiti and the Constitution: A First Amendment Analysis
of the Los Angeles Tagging Crew Injunction, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 219–20 (2011). View-
point neutrality means that the speech being regulated is not restricted based on the speaker’s
view of the subject (e.g., restricting anti-abortion speech would be a viewpoint regulation).
See Blocher, supra note 123, at 703–07. Subject matter neutrality means that the speech
being restricted is not regulated based on the subject of the speech (e.g., restricting all speech
on abortion topics, regardless of the viewpoint would be a subject matter regulation). See
Lauren N. Follett, Note, Taming the Paparazzi in the “Wild West”: A Look at California’s
2009 Amendment to the Anti-Paparazzi Act and a Call for Increased Privacy Protections for
Celebrity Children, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 201, 231 (2010); R. George Wright, Content-Based
and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 333, 333–35 (2006).
125 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50 (1987).
In the simplest terms, a rational basis inquiry asks whether the regulation is rationally related
to a legitimate government interest. Id. Generally, however, if a regulation is not content-
neutral, then it must pass a strict scrutiny analysis. See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and
Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81
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3. Symbolic Speech
Further, other forms of expression—besides merely verbal and written speech—
are protected by the First Amendment.126 For instance, when the state regulates
conduct, the regulations must be content-neutral: that is, the regulations cannot be
administered against conduct with the purpose of restricting speech.127 Further,
expressive conduct is protected under the First Amendment if that conduct is intended
to convey a particularized message, and there is a high degree of likelihood that the
message will be understood by the intended audience.128 However, unlike the verbal
and written word, expressive conduct receives a lower standard of protection.129
4. Time, Place, and Manner Regulations
Although general prohibitions of speech are prohibited by the First Amendment,
regulations that regulate when, where, and/or how speech takes place are permissi-
ble. Specifically Time, Place, and Manner regulations are those restrictions of speech
that effectively regulate the pragmatic components of one’s expression; the Supreme
Court noted in Cox v. Louisiana130 that individuals cannot constitutionally demand
that they choose when, where, and how131 they express themselves because of the
risk it would pose to the general public.132 Like all restrictions of speech, judicial
scrutiny requires that Time, Place, and Manner regulations be content-neutral.133 But
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1363–67 (2006). Strict scrutiny requires (1) that the state have
a compelling interest to regulate the speech; (2) that the regulation be narrowly tailored to
that interest; and (3) that the regulation be the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest. Id. at 1363, 1365 n.62.
126 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (reasoning that the private
display of a flag was protected expression); see also Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and
Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1844–85 (1997) (providing an overview of the
Symbolic Speech Doctrine).
127 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning is a type
of speech protected by the First Amendment).
128 See Spence, 418 U.S. at 404 (stating that expressive conduct is protected under the First
Amendment, if the conduct is particular in nature, and intended to convey some message). See
generally United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (reasoning that expressive conduct
is protected by the First Amendment).
129 Specifically, the regulation employed by the state must be narrowly tailored to an
important, rather than substantial, state interest. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77.
130 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
131 See Neal Ternes, Note, Everywhere a Sign: ESPN College GameDay and the First
Amendment, 17 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 159, 163–64 (2016) (discussing “university-
created time, place, and manner restrictions on speech,” such as “free speech zones,” as
being “successfully challenged several times”).
132 Cox, 379 U.S. at 554–55; see also Ternes, supra note 131, at 163–64.
133 See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803–05 (1984);
see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“The
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even if a law is content-neutral, it must nevertheless fulfill intermediate scrutiny.134
This means that the regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve an important state
interest.135 While a seemingly strict test, the state is provided considerable leeway
when it comes to what qualifies as an important state interest.136 And, to be sure, the
state’s interests can be as meager as community aesthetics.137
This type of regulation is the most relevant set of speech restrictions for this
Note, because universities generally justify their speech regulations through Time,
Place, and Manner.138 To be sure, universities are afforded significant leeway when
restricting speech139 because courts have consistently held that university interests—
such as public safety and educational success—qualify as important state interests.140
B. Free Association
Today, Americans also enjoy a robust set of associational rights.141 Association-
al rights can be defined as either intimate or expressive; and both intimate and
State may . . . enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression which are
content-neutral . . . .”).
134 See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 805; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–27 (2010) (reasoning that, under intermediate scrutiny, a content-
neutral restriction is valid if it advances an important government interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech).
135 See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804–05; Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
at 26–27.
136 See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804–05; see also Humanitarian Law Project,
561 U.S. at 25–28.
137 See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 789, 805, 817 (holding that the aesthetic in-
terests of the city, alone, were an important state interest).
138 See Thomas J. Davis, Note, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University Free
Speech Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND. L.J. 267, 279–89 (2004) (discussing
a string of federal appellate and Supreme Court cases applying the time, place, and manner
doctrine to campus free speech zones); see also, e.g., Code of Student Conduct 2017–18,
SAGINAW VALLEY ST. U., http://www.svsu.edu/studentconductprograms/codeofstudentconduct/
[https://perma.cc/SB7J-WVNK] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) (permitting assemblage and ex-
pression, as long as they are “held in such a place and manner so that the public peace of the
campus is maintained”).
139 See Derek P. Langhauser, Drawing the Line Between Free and Regulated Speech on
Public College Campuses: Key Steps and the Forum Analysis, 181 EDUC. LAW REP. 339
(2003) (discussing free and regulated speech on college campuses, and the ability for public
colleges to restrict students’ speech rights).
140 See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Lighting a FIRE on College Campuses: An
Inside Perspective on Free Speech, Public Policy & Higher Education, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 205, 205–06, 220–21 (2005) (discussing the prevalence of time, place, and manner
restrictions on college campuses).
141 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 980–82 (2011).
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expressive associations implicate special constitutional protections.142 Intimate
associations exist when individuals associate with other persons for the purpose of
expanding personal relationships.143 Justice William Brennan articulated that “choices
to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”144 The general
question courts must answer to determine whether an organization is intimate is
whether the organization is “sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional
protection.”145 Alternatively, expressive associations exist when individuals join into
associations to further some constitutionally protected expression, such as religious
practice or political petition.146
The Supreme Court has further held that, when the two above forms of associations
mold together—to form an intimate, expressive association—the association itself
receives the highest level of constitutional protection: strict scrutiny.147 To determine
if an association qualifies as both intimate and expressive, a court must independ-
ently determine whether an association is: (1) intimate; and (2) expressive.148
To qualify as an intimate association, an organization must satisfy a non-
exhaustive set of factors.149 Justice Stevens articulated in Boy Scouts of America v.
142 See id. at 987 (indicating that in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court
distinguished between “a right of intimate association, rooted in the Court’s privacy juris-
prudence, and [expressive association, rooted in the] First Amendment right of association
for the purposes of engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment”); Louis Norvell,
Constitutional Law: Defining the Boundaries of Protected Intimate Associations, 50 FLA. L.
REV. 233 (1998) (discussing the basic protections afforded to intimate associations).
143 See Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First
Century, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 277 (2006) (“[T]he choice to enter into some
types of intimate associations, including marriage, family relationships, and other close
personal relationships, is an essential liberty that is central to constitutional protections of
individual freedom.”).
144 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984).
145 Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546 (1987); see
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 646–47 (2000).
146 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 (stating that “the Court has recognized a right to associate for
the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion”).
147 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 646–56 (discussing the expressive and intimate nature of the Boy
Scouts of America, and their ability to discriminate based on sexual orientation to preserve
the expressive values of “morally straight” conduct); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 610
(discussing the expressive associational right). The Court’s logic for this heightened level of
protection is that intimately expressive associations naturally implicate both the privacy right
to intimate association, as well as the First Amendment expressive right of “express[ing] a
belief” in something. Dale, 530 U.S. at 646–56.
148 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 647–49; Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545–46.
149 See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546.
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Dale150 that “[t]hough the precise scope of the right to intimate association is unclear,
‘we consider factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded
from critical aspects of the relationship’ to determine whether a group is sufficiently
personal to warrant . . . constitutional protection” as an intimate association.151 If an
organization is sufficiently intimate, courts then ask whether the organization’s
purpose—in whole or in part—is to express some constitutionally protected right.152
If so, then the organization qualifies as an intimate, expressive association.153
C. The Relationship Between Free Speech and Free Association
As Professor Bhagwat informs, “[m]odern law tends to treat the associational
right as subsidiary to free speech and tends to assume that the primary purpose of
association is to facilitate speech.”154 This conclusion comes from a long history of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which demonstrates the need for associations to mask
their associational privileges with other First Amendment rights.155 Because of this,
associations seeking protection typically demonstrate that their associational purpose
is to fulfill some other, First Amendment right (such as free expression).156 Along
this line, it is likewise well-established that an intimate association may restrict its
own membership’s speech, and regulate its members’ expressive conduct to fulfill
its expressive interests.157
150 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
151 Id. at 698 n.26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 546).
152 See id. at 646–56; see also Neal Troum, Expressive Association and the Right to Exclude:
Reading Between the Lines in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 641,
644–45 (2002) (analyzing the case, and explaining the Expressive Association Doctrine).
153 See, e.g., Troum, supra note 152, at 644–52.
154 Bhagwat, supra note 141, at 1029; see, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (stating that to ascer-
tain whether the Boy Scout’s associational rights were protected by the First Amendment,
the Court must determine if they engage in protected expression).
155 The First Amendment does not enumerate a specific right to association. See U.S.
CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.”). However, the Supreme Court has recognized a right to privacy (intimate
association) and a right to associate for the purpose of expression (expressive association).
See supra notes 142–54 and accompanying text. Because of this historic development, the
Court often treats the Association Doctrine as merely a doctrine to serve other constitutional
interests, such as free expression. See generally John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-
Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149 (2010) (discussing, in part,
the development of intimate and expressive association, and how the Court treats these
doctrines as subsidiary to other constitutional interests).
156 See Bhagwat, supra note 141, at 999–1002. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
157 See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (holding that the Boy Scouts of America could limit
its membership based on sexual orientation, and limit its members’ expression to “morally
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D. Public Universities and the Application of Constitutional Law
State universities are agents of the state, and can be sued for injunctive relief if
they violate the constitutional rights of others.158 However, places of education are
afforded significant deference to protect the educational interests of the state.159 The
Court has recognized that the academic interests of universities often trump the
constitutional interests of the students.160 Because of this, it is relevant to note some
of the deference provided to universities in restricting speech and association.
1. Free Speech on University Campuses and the Academic Safe Space
As noted, universities restrict many forms of speech. Specifically, universities
tend to justify their restrictions based in large part on Time, Place, and Manner.161
As discussed in a previous section, Time, Place and Manner regulations are granted
significant leeway by the courts.162 The state’s interest in maintaining safety, in-
creasing aesthetic beauty, and promoting the educational interests of the students
provides universities with ample state interests to pass intermediate scrutiny for
some speech restrictions.163
However, it is unlikely that Time, Place, and Manner restrictions would satisfy
constitutional muster as applied to Safe Space policies. The requisite inquiry for a
Time, Place, and Manner regulation is whether the speech restriction is content
neutral.164 Since Safe Spaces necessarily restrict certain types of content, Safe Space
policies would fail this initial inquiry.165
straight” conduct); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629–31 (1984) (indicating the
possibility for a private association to limit its members’ composition).
158 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (holding that “state colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment”).
159 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (noting
that the court has repeatedly emphasized the need to affirm the authority of school officials,
consistent with constitutional safeguards); Calvert & Richards, supra note 140, at 205–06.
160 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685–87, 693–97 (2010); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981).
161 See Davis, supra note 138, at 279–84.
162 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–28 (2010); Members
of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804–05 (1984).
163 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679–87; see also discussion supra Sec-
tion II.A.
164 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679–87; see also discussion supra Sec-
tion II.A.
165 This is not to say, however, that Safe Spaces would not pass the requisite strict scrutiny
inquiry. See discussion infra Part IV.
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2. Free Association on University Campuses
The pinnacle case defining the limits of Free Association at public universities
is Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.166 In Christian Legal Society, the Supreme
Court held that state universities could regulate the associational membership of stu-
dents, despite the intimate and expressive rights asserted by the group.167 Specifically,
the Court determined that the state’s interest in limiting discrimination was compel-
ling enough to regulate students’ intimate and expressive associational rights.168 Since
Christian Legal Society, the Court has not taken up another university free associa-
tion case. As such, it is likely that the standards set by Christian Legal Society will
continue to impact RSOs at public universities for the foreseeable future.
III. NORMATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF ACADEMIC SAFE SPACES AND THE
FREE SPEECH CRITIQUE
Before applying the free speech and associational doctrines to the three forms
of Safe Space policies overviewed in Part I, it is necessary to lay forth the normative
assertions of the Free Speech Critique and Safe Space policies. As I indicated in the
Introduction, this Note does not compare the normative qualities of the free speech
critique with those of Safe Spaces.169 However, this Note’s principle aim is to
reconcile the Free Speech Critique with Safe Space policies in order to safeguard the
interests of each. The natural question derived from this thesis, then, is why should we
attempt to safeguard either of the aforementioned interests? To answer this question,
this section will briefly detail the positive, normative qualities of both Safe Space
policies and free expression in academia.
A. The Value of Academic Safe Spaces
First, it has been postulated that Safe Spaces create a healthy learning environ-
ment for minorities.170 Minorities often feel at risk of being targeted by majority
166 561 U.S. 661 (2010); see David Brown, Hey! Universities! Leave Them Kids Alone!:
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez and Conditioning Equal Access to a University’s Student
Organization Forum, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 163 (2011) (discussing the effects of the Christian
Legal Society decision on associational rights of students at public universities); see also
Melanie Crouch, The Public University’s Right to Prohibit Discrimination, 53 HOUS. L. REV.
1369 (2016) (analyzing the ability of state universities to regulate student associational rights
to promote inclusion).
167 See 561 U.S. at 669.
168 Id. at 690, 694. It is relevant to note that the decision in Christian Legal Society was
based on the state’s interest in inclusivity. Id. Therefore, as applied to organizations that
exclude individuals based on non-inclusive speech, a university would likely not be able to
assert the same interest. This would affect the institution’s constitutional ability to regulate
inclusive associations.
169 See supra Introduction.
170 See, e.g., Paxson, supra note 39; Schapiro, supra note 3.
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students.171 This can result in minority students being cut-off in their education, or
feeling incapable of contributing to their learning environment.172 Safe Spaces help
rectify these issues by providing minority students with an avenue to express them-
selves, and confront many of the personal, intimate issues they face.173 Second, Safe
Spaces allow minority students an avenue to express their specific concerns about
campus life.174 Third, many proponents argue that Safe Spaces promote inclusivity.175
As the Court has continually recognized since its decision in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke,176 universities have a compelling state interest in the
inclusivity of minority students.177 Additionally, Safe Spaces can protect minority
students from feeling as though they are the sole representative of their class.178
It is also relevant to note that, on top of the normative attributes referenced above,
the LGBT community has a long history of using Safe Spaces.179 This history has
created a symbolic attachment180: for the LGBT community, Safe Spaces are a part
of not only their movement’s success, but also of their collective resistance against
majority oppression.181 And, whatever may be said about the normative attributes of
Safe Spaces, certainly the LGBT movement itself has a significant interest in pre-
serving the institution of the Safe Space.182
B. The Free Speech Critique
Although it is not seriously contested that Safe Spaces provide some normative
good,183 it is likewise not seriously contested that Safe Space policies tend to restrict
speech.184 As noted in the Introduction, the Safe Space debate has been routinely
171 See, e.g., Paxson, supra note 39; Schapiro, supra note 3.
172 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 3; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–33
(2003) (discussing the importance of having a “critical mass” of minority students in higher
education).
173 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 3.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
177 See generally id.; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (discussing the Court’s
acknowledgment of the contribution diversity makes to higher education).
178 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 3. The Supreme Court recognized in Grutter that uni-
versities have an interest in insuring that minority students are not the sole representatives
of their class. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–38 (2003).
179 See generally HANHARDT, supra note 45.
180 See id. at 30–31.
181 See generally id.
182 See generally, e.g., id.
183 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 3. But see, e.g., Morey, supra note 2.
184 See Paxson, supra note 39 (indicating safe spaces are areas where students can be free
of harassing speech).
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characterized in terms of free speech and speech restrictions.185 And even proponents
of Safe Spaces must concede that Safe Space policies inherently restrict some forms
of speech.186 Acting on this recognition—as well as on the well-recognized norma-
tive value of speech in the United States—critics have established the Free Speech
Critique of Safe Spaces. The Free Speech Critique has two basic components. First,
opponents of Safe Spaces argue that some—if not all—Safe Space policies violate
constitutionally protected speech.187 Second, opponents use the Free Speech Critique
as a normative buffer against Safe Spaces, indicating that speech is too important to
sacrifice, even in light of societal discrimination.188 This is especially implicated
when it comes to education.189
In sum, the first major concern for the Free Speech Critique is that Safe Space
policies, as promulgated by state institutions, can breach the Constitution’s guaran-
tee of free speech.190 Secondly, even if the speech restrictions promulgated by Safe
Space policies do not breach the First Amendment, they nevertheless violate the
normative foundations of free speech and expression.191 This is especially so when
the free expression of ideas in education is implicated.192
C. Solving the Safe Space Debate with Free Association
Congressman Jamie Raskin, an American University constitutional law profes-
sor, stated during a lecture that “[w]e all want maximum freedom of expression,
[but] . . . [o]n the other hand, we all want the maximum of personal respect. The
problem is that one person’s exercise of free speech may look a lot like disrespect
to somebody else.”193 In essence, Raskin’s lecture sought to explain the normative
185 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. This is not to say, however, that other
critiques of Safe Spaces are without merit. Some scholars, for instance, critique Safe Spaces
as “identity apartheid,” essentially condemning Safe Spaces as negatively effecting the very
goals of inclusion. See Kuykendall & Adside, supra note 24, at 1076–81 (discussing the
potential harmful effects of Safe Spaces on the principles of inclusion). While alternative
critiques have merit, the vast majority of critics focus on the Free Speech Critique and, given
the practical limitations of this Note, I focus my attention there.
186 See Garrett, supra note 88; Schapiro, supra note 3. Additionally, it would be difficult
for proponents of Safe Spaces to argue that some kinds of speech are not restricted. Nearly
every colloquial and academic definition of Safe Space policies involves the restriction of
some expression. See discussion supra Sections I.B–D.
187 See, e.g., Cliff Maloney, Jr., Colleges Have No Right to Limit Students’ Free Speech,
TIME (Oct. 13, 2016), https://time.com/4530197/college-free-speechzone/ [https://perma.cc
/7DL3-HKP6].
188 See, e.g., id. To be sure, this second component avoids the constitutional inquiry entirely.
189 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
193 Safe Spaces and Free Speech on Campus, AM. U. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www
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conflict between the academic interest in free expression, and the personal interests
of Safe Space policies.194
As has been discussed throughout this Note, there is an immense value placed
on both campus free speech and Safe Space policies.195 Despite their values, these
two sets of arguments directly conflict with the interests of one another.196 The ques-
tion is, now, whether there is a proper way to reconcile the values asserted by both Safe
Spaces and the Free Speech Critique. As indicated in Sections II.B–C, intimate asso-
ciation doctrine provides an avenue for some organizations to restrict the speech of
their membership without violating free speech doctrine.197
By categorizing certain RSOs as Safe Spaces, such organizations can constitu-
tionally and normatively restrict the speech and conduct of their members by utilizing
free association principles.198 This defense of Safe Spaces inherently shifts the
debate away from discussions about isolated speech restrictions to a debate about
the proper balance between associational and speech rights. Apart from the constitu-
tional considerations, altering the debate’s rhetoric has numerous normative advan-
tages for the parties in this debate.
As will be demonstrated in Part IV, applying the free speech doctrine to Safe
Spaces indicates that the Traditional Safe Space and Campus-Wide Safe Zone policies
fail on multiple normative and constitutional grounds. However, Organizational Safe
Spaces do not succumb to either free speech constitutional challenges or the norma-
tive component of the Free Speech Critique. To be sure, the robust rights guaranteed
to organizations under the free association doctrine—as well as the associational
doctrine’s ability to permit organizations to safeguard against offensive speech—
adequately protect Safe Spaces from constitutional, normative, and practical attacks.
IV. STATE UNIVERSITY SAFE SPACES: A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY
It has been argued throughout this Note that the normative claims of both Safe
Space proponents and the Free Speech critics have considerable merit,199 and that,
without proper resolution, both stand to significantly suffer at the success of the
other.200 To resolve this issue, I have asserted that the best way to reconcile the Safe
Space debate is to protect Safe Spaces through the intimate, expressive association
doctrine.201 In this way, the free speech doctrine is safe guarded from both normative
.american.edu/cas/news/Jamie-Raskin-and-Political-Correctness.cfm [https://perma.cc/577G
-VC9E].
194 Id.
195 See Pérez-Peña et al., supra note 2; Schapiro, supra note 3.
196 See, e.g., Safe Spaces and Free Speech on Campus, supra note 193.
197 See discussion supra Sections II.B–C.
198 See supra notes 103–13, 154–57 and accompanying text.
199 See discussion supra Introduction, Part III.
200 See discussion supra Introduction, Part III.
201 See discussion supra Section III.C.
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and constitutional attacks by proponents of Safe Space policies.202 And further, this
resolution will protect Safe Space policies from constitutional attacks by a long-
lasting and robust free speech doctrine.203
The following section analyzes the three principle forms of Safe Space Policies.
I contend that, while the Traditional Safe Space and Campus-Wide Safe Zone have
notable normative attributes, the policies cannot survive free speech challenges.
Further, I will argue that these policies cannot avail themselves of associational pro-
tections, since they lack an intimate structure. Last, I assert that, while Organizational
Safe Spaces may contradict some normative free speech ideals, these Safe Spaces
are protected from constitutional and normative challenges because of their associa-
tional qualities.
A. The Traditional Safe Space
Recall that the Traditional Safe Space manifests in a single, physical location,
such as an administrative office.204 Inside this Safe Space, students are discouraged
from discussing certain topics which may be harmful to minority students.205 Be-
cause certain topics—especially those deemed harmful to minorities—are prohibited,
a challenged Traditional Safe Space policy will likely be deemed a content-based
restriction of speech, since the Safe Space discriminates on what speakers may or
may not express.206
To be sure, a court could find that the state’s interests in inclusion and educational
rights of minorities satisfy the requisite compelling state interest, thereby passing
constitutional muster. In fact, if the university has any substantial or compelling in-
terest at all, it is certainly the interest of promoting inclusivity.207 However, this
justification is subject to the same normative criticisms discussed in Section III.B.208
And, because of its conflict with the normative aspects of the Free Speech Critique,
the Traditional Safe Space should be dismissed as a viable solution to this debate
even if it were deemed constitutional.
Additionally, this model does not guarantee intimate associate rights for the
membership, because a traditional safe space is open to all students and faculty at
202 See discussion supra Section III.C.
203 See discussion supra Section III.C.
204 See, e.g., LGBTQ Safe Space, supra note 80; Moorthy, supra note 82.
205 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 3 (describing the purpose of safe spaces for minority
students who desire to avoid harassment or find comfort).
206 Therefore, the university cannot justify Traditional Safe Space restrictions as a Time,
Place, and Manner regulation. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text; cf. Blocher,
supra note 123, at 703–07 (discussing viewpoint neutrality and the invalidity of government
discrimination against particular viewpoints).
207 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–33 (2003).
208 See discussion supra Section III.B.
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a given university.209 This means that the “organization” would have a large, fluid
membership. As such, neither the selectivity nor size requirements under the Rotary
Club standard would be met.210
B. The Campus-Wide Safe Zones
While Campus-Wide Safe Zones take many forms, all such policies act to restrict
content-based speech.211 Naturally, this submits these Safe Space policies to height-
ened constitutional review.212 Additionally, these restrictions differ from other Safe
Space policies because they cannot be effectively defended as Time, Place, and
Manner restrictions. This is because speakers in this model are, in all places and
times, barred from speaking certain things.213 Hence, such restrictions would likely
be subject to strict scrutiny.214 And, much like the Traditional Safe Space, Campus-
Wide Safe Zones would likely fail constitutional muster.
But, even if the regulation were viewed as a Time, Place, and Manner restriction,
the government would have a difficult time showing that the regulation was the least
restrictive means of promoting its interest, since these regulations are inherently
broad. However, in the limited circumstances when the university implements a
policy that is not overly broad, Campus-Wide Safe Zones are nevertheless suscepti-
ble to normative free speech concerns. Moreover, since Campus-Wide Safe Zones
inherently involve a larger, non-selective populace, it is unlikely that such restric-
tions could be defended on intimate, expressive associational grounds.215
C. The Organizational Safe Space Model
As detailed in Section I.D, the Organizational Safe Space model typically
manifests in an independent RSO policy, either through a group bylaw or governing
document.216 These general policies and procedures require that the organization’s
209 See, e.g., LGBTQ Safe Space, supra note 80 (indicating that the university safe space
program works to shape a “[u]niversity[ ] culture that is accepting of all people, regardless
of sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, or any other difference” (emphasis added)).
210 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 646 (2000).
211 See, e.g., supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp. Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating
that content-based speech restrictions receive strict scrutiny).
213 See supra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
214 Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813 (stating that content-based restrictions on speech
receive strict scrutiny).
215 It should be noted that a university may argue that their entire campus community is
an intimate association. However, this argument would likely not be successful in light of
the Rotary Club factors which, at minimum, require a small, selective population with a unitary
ideology. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
216 See Registered Student Organizations, supra note 102; Start a New Student Organiza-
tion, supra note 104.
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membership observes a Safe Space.217 In part, this likely means that the organization
will restrict members from expressing certain types of speech.218
RSOs which restrict the free expression of their membership are entitled to do
so, since they are likely intimate organizations.219 To be sure, RSOs likely satisfy the
Rotary Club factors, since these organizations have a small size and are selective in
their membership recruiting.220 Moreover, RSOs typically have a narrow, well-defined
purpose, which is served through the specific recruitment of its membership.221
Additionally, not only are many RSOs intimate, many also aim to make socio-political
statements through expression.222 Since such organizations associate to further some
other constitutionally protected interest—i.e., political speech—they receive heightened
constitutional protection in their ability to regulate their members’ expression.223
Additionally, this form of Safe Space policy is not naturally susceptible to im-
mediate free speech concerns—either normatively or constitutionally. As members
of volunteer organizations, members are free to come and go as they please. Without
a mandate to remain in the organization, members who oppose the speech restriction
can exercise their free will to leave the group.224 To be sure, if certain restrictions are
placed on the members’ speech, members displeased with the restriction can leave
the organization.225
Because Organizational Safe Spaces are likely intimate, expressive associations,
they will receive heightened First Amendment protection.226 Under this protection,
RSOs are permitted to discriminate against their membership on the basis of their
217 See, e.g., LGBT Resource Center Affiliated Student Organizations, supra note 105.
218 See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
219 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 698 n.26 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing the factors that the Court uses to determine whether a group is sufficiently
personal to be considered an intimate association).
220 Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.
221 See, e.g., Registered Student Organizations, supra note 102; Student Organizations &
Activities/Financial Accounts, supra note 102 (“RSOs cover a wide range of topics and
interest areas . . . .”).
222 See, e.g., LGBT Resource Center Affiliated Student Organizations, supra note 105.
223 See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 646–56, 696–97 (“An expressive association claim, however,
normally involves the avowal and advocacy of a consistent position on some issue . . . . This
is why a different kind of scrutiny must be given to an expressive association claim . . . .”).
224 Leaving the group is also a way for disenfranchised members and free speech ad-
vocates to “voice” their concern about the RSO’s policy through the protest of resigning. In
this way, the Free Speech advocates are satisfied, because they can voice their concern
nonverbally; and, likewise, the Safe Space advocates are satisfied, since the RSO was not
subjected to harmful speech.
225 Cf. Chapin Cimino, Campus Citizenship and Associational Freedom: An Aristotelian
Take on the Nondiscrimination Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 564 (2011)
(discussing the fact that individuals prevented from discriminating under anti-discrimination
laws may simply leave the group).
226 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 646–56.
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members’ expression during meetings, social events, and gatherings.227 As such, RSOs
can manifest constitutionally enhanced Safe Spaces through intimate, expressive as-
sociation. Not only does the Safe Space model constitutionally protect Safe Spaces,
it also limits the normative concerns in the Free Speech Critique by making Safe
Spaces wholly voluntary on one’s intimate association.
V. ADDRESSING HYPOTHETICAL CRITICISMS
As far as this Author can ascertain, this proposed reconciliation of the Safe Space
debate is completely novel. As a result, there are no formal critiques to this Note’s
principal proposition. The subsequent critiques and rebukes are merely imaginative.
And, because the critiques are born of this Author’s own biases, the below articulated
challenges are not intended to be exhaustive. This Author invites his colleagues to
continue research in this field, and to expand this scholarly debate.
A. Student-Run Safe Spaces Will Not Adequately Serve Minority Students
at University
Proponents of Safe Space policies may argue that student-run safe spaces will
not adequately serve the interests of minority students, because students are not
equipped with adequate resources, experience, or training. In this way, the critique
will likely follow some of the due process concerns accompanying student-run
hearing panels.228 However, most student organizations are not solely managed by
the students themselves. First, RSOs typically have faculty and/or staff advisors.229
These advisors monitor the organization, and ensure that it upholds its mission and
complies with school policy.230 Second, universities sanction every RSO on campus.231
As part of this sanctioning, the university has the ability to punish an organization
if it fails to uphold its mission.232
Furthermore, this critique assumes that students within these intimate, Safe
Space organizations, will not have a strong interest to advance a proper Safe Space
policy. It is important to recognize that, as agents of a Safe Space, the members will
likely have a self-interest to promote an inclusive space. Last, students at higher
227 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
228 See generally Marie T. Reilly, Due Process in Public University Discipline Cases, 120
PENN ST. L. REV. 1001 (2016) (discussing the inadequacy of some student and faculty run
hearing panels at public universities).
229 See, e.g., Advisors, U. CENT. FLA., https://osi.ucf.edu/blog/rso-info/advisors/ [https://
perma.cc/3TPC-A6EC] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
230 See, e.g., id.
231 See, e.g., Registered Student Organizations, supra note 102; Start a New Student
Organization, supra note 104.
232 See, e.g., Code of Student Conduct 2017–18, supra note 138.
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educational institutions are often granted significant authority to defend the rights
and interests of their fellow students.233 Therefore, merely because a Safe Space is
student-run does not necessarily mean that it will not adequately protect the interests
of minority students.
B. The RSOs May Not Be Intimate in Nature
Other critics may contend that RSOs promulgating Safe Spaces are not intimate
associations. The critique follows that because most universities have non-discrimi-
nation policies,234 the organization cannot truly be intimate, because it does not meet
the “selectivity” factor under the Court’s precedent. However, the Court’s decision
in Christian Legal Society indicated that the Christian Legal Society was an intimate
association;235 and, the Court did not indicate that the Christian Legal Society lost
its associational status merely by adhering to a non-discrimination policy.236 Addi-
tionally, as the Court reasoned in both Dale and Roberts, an intimate association need
not meet every single “intimacy factor” to be considered an intimate association.237
C. RSOs Cannot Restrict Speech Because They Are an Arm of the State
One final critique may be that, since RSOs are sanctioned by state universities,
they are, in fact, arms of the state. As such, they would not be permitted to regulate stu-
dent speech on the basis of content. However, RSOs are not mandatory activities for
students; in fact, they are completely voluntary.238 As the Supreme Court has articulated
time and again, if citizens submit themselves to constitutional violations—through
voluntary involvement or activity—there is no cognizable constitutional claim.239
233 For instance, most American universities and colleges have student-run unions and
governments aimed at protecting the interests and rights of their fellow students. See, e.g.,
Our Mission, HARV. UNDERGRADUATE COUNCIL, https://uc.fas.harvard.edu/ [https://perma.cc
/BEB4-EK4P] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017); Judicial, U. MICH.: CENT. STUDENT GOV’T, https://
csg.umich.edu/judicial/ [https://perma.cc/Z2HM-MU9X] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017). Addition-
ally, some colleges have student-run hearing panels, responsible for adjudicating academic
and behavioral misconduct. See, e.g., Law School Honor Council Bylaws, WM. & MARY
LAW SCH. HONOR COUNCIL, http://wmpeople.wm.edu/asset/index/lawhonor/lawschoolhonor
councilbylaws2016 [https://perma.cc/K7JE-V6ZU] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
234 See generally Brown, supra note 166 (discussing the use of nondiscrimination policies
on college campuses); see also Student Organizations: University Recognition, supra note
103 (“Membership [in the RSO] must meet the university’s nondiscrimination policy.”).
235 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 678–85 (2010) (“Insisting that
an organization embrace unwelcome members . . . ‘directly and immediately affects asso-
ciational rights.’” (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000)).
236 See generally id.
237 See supra notes 145–54 and accompanying text.
238 Cf. Student Organizations, VA. TECH STUDENT ENGAGEMENT & CAMPUS LIFE, https://
campuslife.vt.edu/Student_Orgs.html [https://perma.cc/X93S-ZF7Y] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
239 See, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986) (White, J., concurring) (noting
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Further, even if RSOs were considered arms of the state, their interests in preserving
inclusivity would likely overcome a free speech challenge.240
CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated the complicated normative and constitutional debate
surrounding academic Safe Spaces, and how this debate can negatively impact free
speech, as well as the interests of minority students and Safe Space policies.241 There
is little debate that the interests of minority students—which are safeguarded by Safe
Space policies—are meritorious.242 Similarly, the normative and constitutional
interests asserted by proponents of the Free Speech Critique are not seriously con-
tested.243 As Congressman Raskin articulated, the problem with the instant Safe Space
debate is that the interests of each side are substantial; and that, further, each side
is gravely concerned with the outcome of this debate.244 To be sure, this grave concern
comes from a recognition that the success of one side of this debate necessarily requires
the demise of the other.245 In response to this serious threat, this Note postulated that
academic Safe Spaces and students’ free speech interests can be safeguarded by
analyzing the instant debate through the lens of free association.246
By analyzing the three common forms of Safe Space policies, the reconciliatory
conclusion drawn in Section III.C is best served through the Organizational Safe Space
Model. First, the Organizational Safe Space model provides for the only intimate
and expressive associational Safe Space policy of the three types reviewed in this
Note.247 Second, the Organizational Safe Space model clearly justifies restrictions
of speech because of the constitutional and normative associational values inherent
in RSOs.248 As a result, I recommend that Safe Space policies should be limited to
the Organizational Model. Not only will this silence Safe Space critics, but it will
also bolster the normative and constitutional position of Safe Space policies.
Despite the practical appeal of this approach, it is not without criticism. First,
leaving the management of Safe Spaces to students may prove inadequate for safe-
guarding minority students’ interests. However, this critique discounts the shared
that there was no constitutional violation in single-race clubs since one’s choice of club is
entirely voluntary).
240 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003) (reasoning that state uni-
versities have a compelling interest in diversity); Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 690–94
(reasoning that the interest of the public university in limiting discrimination was valid).
241 See discussion supra Introduction, Sections III.B–C.
242 See, e.g., Schapiro, supra note 3; Strauss, supra note 3.
243 See Safe Spaces and Free Speech on Campus, supra note 193.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See discussion supra Section III.C.
247 See discussion supra Section IV.C.
248 See discussion supra Section IV.C.
2017] PROTECTING THE SILENCE OF SPEECH 587
Safe Space “interests” of students in the same associational organization. Addition-
ally, the administration of student rights is often left to the discretion of student
leaders, whether this be in student government or student-run hearing panels.249
Second, some critics may argue that RSOs are not intimate associations at all.
However, this flies directly in the face of the Supreme Court’s decision in Christian
Legal Society, where the Court reasoned that RSOs could, in fact, possess the
expressive qualities necessary to invoke associational rights.250 Last, other critics
may postulate that, even if RSOs are intimate, intimate organizations do not have
the right to restrict speech when they are sanctioned by the state. But, while RSOs
are sanctioned by the state, they are voluntary in nature; therefore, RSOs are still
permitted to restrict the speech of their membership.251
While appealing, it may be argued, that the reconciliatory view articulated in
this Note is nothing but unfettered, unabashed compromise; a deal struck between
two normatively sound positions by an Author choosing cooperation in light of the
grave loses associated with the defeat of either side of the debate. If it is the case that
the reconciliation argued for in this Note is nothing but a compromise between two
normative heavy-weights, it should not be dismissed out of hand. After all, “[t]he
Constitution itself, plainly written as it is, the safeguard of our federative compact
[is] the offspring of concession and compromise.”252 Let it be, then, that this norma-
tive and constitutional debate of our time be settled as the Founding Fathers settled
theirs: a compromise.
249 See, e.g., Judicial, supra note 233.
250 See 561 U.S. 661, 678–83 (2010) (reasoning that a less restrictive standard of scrutiny
still respects a student organization’s expressive association rights).
251 See supra notes 216–27 and accompanying text; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640, 646–56 (2000) (concluding that forced inclusion in the Boy Scouts of
homosexuals against the Boy Scout’s expressed beliefs violated their freedom of expression).
252 President James Knox Polk, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1845), http://avalon.law.yale
.edu/19th_century/polk.asp [https://perma.cc/P65D-4M2E].
